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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Facts 
On August 10, 2000,1 Todd Urban, thirty-four, and his wife 
Barbara Ann, thirty-eight, were driving south on Highway 52 in 
Goodhue County, Minnesota with their young children, five-year 
old Marcus and two-year old twins Michael and Brett.2  The Urbans 
were traveling to Janesville, Wisconsin to leave their children with 
Todd’s parents while Todd and Barbara went to a softball 
tournament for the weekend.3
At the same time, Orvin Rolland, eighty-four, who had been 
drinking at the American Legion Post in Pine Island, Minnesota, 
was driving north in the southbound lane of Highway 52.4  Rolland 
drove the wrong way down the highway for at least a few miles; 
other drivers used cell phones to report the problem to the State 
Patrol.5  Unfortunately, state troopers did not respond quickly 
enough.6
Todd Urban was following another vehicle in the southbound 
lane of the highway.  The other vehicle swerved to avoid Rolland’s 
car, and Todd collided head-on with Rolland.7  The collision killed 
Barbara and Rolland.8  Todd suffered a crushed right leg, a broken 
left wrist, and a dislocated right shoulder.9  Marcus was paralyzed 
from the chest down.10  Brett was left in a coma and needed to have 
 1. Urban v. Am. Legion Dep’t of Minn., 723 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 2006); John 
Weiss, 2 Die in Head-on Crash on U.S. 52, THE ROCHESTER POST-BULL. (Minn.), Aug. 
11, 2000, available at http://www.duipictures.com/barbara.htm.  The court of 
appeals incorrectly listed the date of the accident as August 10, 2004.  Urban v. 
Am. Legion Post 184, 695 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d, 723 
N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2006). 
 2. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 2. 
 3. Wrong-Way Driver Shatters the Lives of a Young Family, THE ROCHESTER POST-
BULL. (Minn.), Sept. 14, 2000, available at http://www.duipictures.com/barbara. 
htm [hereinafter Wrong-Way Driver]. 
 4. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 2–3; Wrong-Way Driver, supra note 3. This was the 
second head-on collision caused by a vehicle driving the wrong way on Highway 52 
in that area in the previous five months.  Wrong-Way Driver, supra note 3. 
 5. Weiss, supra note 1. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Coroner Rules Driver in Fatal Crash Was Drunk, THE ROCHESTER POST-BULL. 
(Minn.), Sept. 5, 2000, available at http://www.duipictures.com/barbara.htm 
[hereinafter Coroner]. 
 8. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 3; Coroner, supra note 7. 
 9. Wrong Way Driver, supra note 3. 
 10. Id. 
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part of his brain and skull removed.11  Michael suffered only minor 
injuries and was released from the hospital shortly after the 
accident.12
The accident was reported to the State Patrol at 5:02 in the 
evening.13  The police found alcohol in Rolland’s car at the scene 
of the accident.14  The coroner later ruled that “acute alcohol 
intoxication” was a significant factor in Rolland’s death.15  The 
death certificate does not reveal Rolland’s exact blood-alcohol 
level, but the diagnosis of acute alcohol intoxication indicates his 
blood-alcohol concentration was at least 0.10 percent.16
B. Background 
In Latin, respondeat superior means “let the superior make 
answer.”17  Respondeat superior is a common-law doctrine of 
vicarious liability that imposes liability “on the master who is not 
directly at fault.”18  In Urban, the Minnesota Supreme Court had to 
determine whether respondeat superior applied to actions brought 
under the Minnesota Civil Damages Act (CDA).19  When an injury 
results from the acts of an intoxicated person who has been illegally 
sold alcohol, the CDA allows the injured victim to bring suit against 
the culpable vendor.20  The CDA created a new statutory “cause of 
action that did not exist at common law.”21
A statute creating a new cause of action abolishes the common 
law only by “by express wording or implication.”22  Therefore, 
unless statutory provisions instruct otherwise, common-law 
principles remain for the court to interpret.23
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Weiss, supra note 1. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Coroner, supra note 7. 
 16. Id. 
 17. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1338 (8th ed. 2004). 
 18. See Lange v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 297 Minn. 399, 403, 211 N.W.2d 783, 785 
(1973) (defining respondeat superior and explaining its policy considerations). 
 19. MINN. STAT. §§ 340A.801–.802 (2004).  See Urban v. Am. Legion Dep’t of 
Minn., 723 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2006). 
 20. § 340A.801, subdiv. 1. 
 21. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 5. 
 22. Id. (quoting Shaw Acquisition Co. v. Bank of Elk River, 639 N.W.2d 837, 
877 (Minn. 2002)). 
 23. See Shaw, 639 N.W.2d at 877. 
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The question remains—under what circumstances can a 
statute be interpreted to abrogate common law?  Courts have used 
many methods of analysis to arrive at this answer, including 
employing the rule that the CDA must be “strictly construed in the 
sense that it cannot be enlarged beyond its definite scope.”24  But, it 
is often difficult for courts to determine what the legislature 
intended the scope of a statute to be.  When legislative intent 
cannot easily be gleaned from the words of a statute, courts employ 
specific methods of statutory construction.  “These rules are said to 
enable interpreters to draw inferences from the language, format, 
and subject matter of the statute.”25  Unfortunately, most methods 
of statutory construction are highly criticized because for every 
canon that might apply, there is an equal and opposite canon.26  
Therefore, the rules often do nothing more than “describ[e] 
results reached by other means,”27 such as in Urban.28
This note first explores the historical development of dram 
shop acts, specifically the CDA and common-law doctrines of 
vicarious liability and respondeat superior.29  It then discusses the 
supreme court’s analysis of Urban30 and analyzes the court’s 
holding.31  This note ultimately concludes that the court’s decision 
in Urban is incorrect and does not serve the intended purposes of 
the CDA.32
II. HISTORY 
A. Alcohol Regulation 
In the two hundred years after Jamestown, Virginia was 
founded in 1607, there were a few pre-Prohibition attempts to limit 
 24. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 6 (quoting Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 34, 70 
N.W.2d 886, 891 (1955)). 
 25. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: 
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 818 (3d ed. 2001). 
 26. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules 
or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950). 
 27. REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 234 
(1975). 
 28. See Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 12–13. 
 29. See infra Part II. 
 30. See infra Part III. 
 31. See infra Part IV. 
 32. See infra Part V. 
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alcohol use.33  Government attempts focused on preventing alcohol 
use by groups likely to organize against the government, 
particularly Native Americans.34  Louis XIV of France prohibited 
the sale of liquor in New France in 1681.35  Alexander Hamilton 
recommended high liquor taxes to raise revenue after the adoption 
of the Constitution, but his proposal was not adopted.36
At the local government level, colonists’ alcohol regulations 
were measures “to outlaw drunkenness, not to reform social 
customs.”37  Because state and local governments felt responsibility 
toward drunken society members, who were viewed as lacking self-
control, strict rules governing tavern owner and patron behavior 
were enacted.38  Actions taken by various religious groups providing 
guidelines or regulations for alcohol use also “played a key role in 
the evolution of Prohibition.”39  By the early nineteenth century, 
Americans’ increasing concern with moral standards led to the 
emergence of societies aimed at reforming morals.40  This led to 
the first anti-alcohol society comprised of men in high social 
standing, in 1813.41  During the mid-1800s, a prohibitionist group 
called the American Temperance Society grew in influence.42  As a 
result, temperance societies became more prevalent, and 
temperance “became a popular intellectual movement.”43
 33. FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., DRINKERS, DRIVERS, AND BARTENDERS: BALANCING 
PRIVATE CHOICES AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 25 (2000). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id.  New France included the territory that later became Michigan, 
Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio.  Id. 
 36. Id. at 26. 
 37. Id.  The goals of tavern restrictions were: (1) to prevent personal excess 
and public disorder; (2) to protect against Native Americans under the influence; 
(3) to provide accommodations in taverns for travelers without exposing them to 
drunkenness and disorder; (4) to recognize the economic importance of the 
brewing and distilling industries; and (5) to raise revenue through liquor taxation.  
Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 27.  The Methodist church began the movement in 1753 by 
enacting disciplinary recommendations for members who drank.  Id.  In 1787, the 
Quakers declared that members should not deal in liquor.  Id.  At a Presbyterian 
convention in Philadelphia in 1812, members agreed to alcohol restrictions.  Id.  
The Methodist General Conference advised its members to discontinue the sale 
and manufacture of alcohol.  Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 27–28. 
 42. Id. at 28. 
 43. Id. at 29.  In 1828, there were 1000 temperance societies with 100,000 
members.  Id.  In 1831, the number had increased to 2200 societies with 170,000 
members.  Id.  By 1832, 4000 societies had emerged with 500,000 members.  Id.  
5
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B. Dram Shop Acts 
1. Background 
Under the common law, servers or suppliers of alcohol were 
not held liable for injuries inflicted on third parties as a result of 
alcohol consumption.44  The rationale for this rule was that drinking 
was the proximate cause45 of intoxication, not the serving of 
alcohol.46  “[E]ven if a vendor breached a duty to those injured by 
an intoxicated person, the vendor was not legally liable” because 
the chain of causation between the vendor’s negligent serving and 
the patron’s injury was held to be severed by the voluntary act of 
drinking the alcohol.47
Departing from the common-law rule, many states began to 
enact civil damage or “dram shop”48 statutes that imposed strict 
liability on vendors for injuries caused by intoxicated patrons.49  
Wisconsin enacted the first of these statutes in 1849.  It required 
that tavern owners post a bond to cover the expenses of 
prosecutions arising from alcohol related accidents and the 
support of poor people, widows, and orphans injured by a patron’s 
excessive consumption.50  Indiana passed the prototype of today’s 
dram shop statute in 1853.51  Eleven states had enacted statutes by 
the mid-1870s.52
Amherst, Dartmouth, Brown, Middlebury, Yale, Union, Kenyon, and Oberlin had 
college temperance organizations as part of the intellectual temperance 
movement.  Id. 
 44. Id. at 115, 118. 
 45. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 234 (8th ed. 2004) (defining proximate cause 
as “cause that is legally sufficient to result in liability; an act or omission that is 
considered in law to result in a consequence, so that liability can be imposed on 
the actor”). 
 46. SLOAN, supra note 33, at 118. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 531 (8th ed. 2004) (defining dram shop as 
“[a] place where alcoholic beverages are sold; a bar or saloon”). 
 49. James R. Myers, Dramshop Liability: The Blurry Status of Drinking Companions, 
34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1153, 1156 (1990) (discussing the historical background of 
dram shop liability). 
 50. Id.  See also Act of February 8, 1850, ch. 139 § 1, 1850 Wis. Sess. Laws 109; 
SLOAN, supra note 33, at 118.
 51. SLOAN, supra note 33, at 118.  The statute stated: 
Any wife, child, parent, guardian, employer or other person who shall be 
injured in person, or property, or means of support, by any intoxicated 
person . . . shall have the right of action in his or her own name against 
any person . . . who shall, by retailing spirituous liquor, have caused the 
6
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Upon the repeal of Prohibition, states stopped enacting dram 
shop statutes.  After World War II, pressure from bars and taverns 
convinced state legislatures to repeal their existing statutes.53  Since 
the 1970s, however, many states have enacted new dram shop 
statutes.54  In other states, liability for dram shops has been imposed 
through modern common law.55  Arkansas, Delaware, Kansas, 
Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, and Virginia do not recognize dram 
shop liability.56
2. Minnesota 
The predecessor to Minnesota’s dram shop act was passed by 
the first Minnesota legislature, which convened in 1858.57  In 1911, 
Minnesota adopted four separate alcohol related statutes, one of 
which was the Civil Damages Act, now codified at section 340A.801 
of Minnesota Statutes.58  Before the enactment of the CDA, those 
injured by intoxicated persons had no cause of action against 
vendors of alcohol because there was no cause of action at common 
law.59  Originally, the adoption of dram shop statutes in Minnesota 
and elsewhere was mostly accomplished as a result of restrictions 
intoxication of such person for any and all such damages sustained and 
for exemplary damages. 
Id. (citing Act of March 4, 1853, § 10, 1853 Ind. Acts 87). 
 52. Id.  These states were Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, 
Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin.  Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id.  Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have 
statutory dram shop liability provisions.  Id. at 116–17 (listing liability by state as of 
1998). 
 55. Id. at 118.  Arizona, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Indiana, 
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West 
Virginia, and Wyoming enforce common law dram shop liability.  Id. at 116–17. 
 56. Id. at 116–17. 
 57. Lindsay G. Arthur, Jr., Minnesota Liquor Liability Law, ADVANCED LEGAL 
EDUC. § 1.2, at 5 (1983).  The legislation made it necessary for those selling 
intoxicating beverages to obtain a license and post a bond in the penal sum of 
$1000 for malt liquors.  Id. 
 58. MINN. STAT. § 340A.801 (2004); Arthur, supra note 57, § 1.2, at 6. 
 59. Strand v. Vill. of Watson, 245 Minn. 414, 419, 72 N.W.2d 609, 614 (1955); 
Arthur, supra note 57, § 1.2, at 6. 
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on alcohol consumption.60  The adoption was a method to control 
liquor traffic, not to compensate injured persons.61  Historically, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court considered the CDA as “highly penal in 
its nature . . . [and] . . . to be strictly construed in the sense that it 
[could not] be enlarged beyond its definite scope . . . .”62  Recently, 
however, the court has applied the CDA’s remedial purposes more 
liberally.63
Minnesota’s dram shop law applies only to commercial 
vendors of alcoholic beverages and not to social hosts.64
Under the current version of the Minnesota Civil Damages 
Act, a plaintiff must satisfy five elements to establish liability against 
a Minnesota liquor vendor: 
 
(1) An illegal sale of intoxicating liquor; 
 
(2) The illegal sale caused or contributed to the 
allegedly intoxicated person’s (AIP) 
intoxication; 
 
(3) The AIP’s intoxication was a direct cause of the 
plaintiff’s injury; 
 
(4) The plaintiff sustained damages recoverable 
under the Civil Damages Act; and 
 
(5) Proper notice must be provided to the liquor 
vendor pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 340A.802.65 
 
 60. Arthur, supra note 57, § 1.2, at 6. 
 61. Id.  For example, the primary consequence of making an illegal sale of 
alcohol under Minnesota’s first Dram Shop Act was loss of license, and liability to 
those injured was limited to $1000.  Id. (citing 1858 Minn. Laws at ch. 124). 
 62. Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 34, 70 N.W.2d 886, 891 (1955). 
 63. Arthur, supra note 57, § 1.2, at 7.  For example, the court stated “[t]he 
civil damage act is both penal and remedial, an inconsistency which we have 
recognized but resolved in favor of a liberal construction to suppress the mischief 
and advance the remedy.”  Id. (citing Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 120, 200 N.W.2d 
149, 152 (1972)). 
 64. Byron M. Peterson et al., Minnesota Liquor Liability, MINN. INST. LEGAL 
EDUC., § 1, at 2 (1999). 
 65. Id. § 1, at 2–3. 
8
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The first element, an illegal sale, can happen in a number of 
ways: (1) sale to an obviously intoxicated person;66 (2) sale to an 
underage drinker;67 (3) sale to a non-member of a club;68 (4) sale 
after hours;69 (5) sale on a prohibited day;70 or (6) an on-sale 
alcoholic beverage is consumed off premises.71  Second, a plaintiff 
must prove that the illegal sale caused or contributed to the 
intoxication.72  The illegal sale need not be the sole cause of 
intoxication.73  “[T]he surrounding circumstances must show ‘a 
practical and substantial relationship’ between the illegal sale and 
intoxication.”74  The plaintiff must also prove that the AIP’s 
intoxication was a direct (proximate) cause of plaintiff’s injuries.75
C. Vicarious Liability 
Typically, liability under tort law in the United States is based 
on fault.76  But in some cases a supervisory party bears liability for 
“the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate . . . based on 
the relationship between the two parties.”77  This doctrine is known 
as vicarious liability. 
Around 1700, the rule of vicarious liability first appeared in 
England’s common law through a series of judicial opinions, 
mainly authored by Justice Holt.78  The new rule was rejected by the 
 66. Id. § 1, at 4. 
 67. Id. § 1, at 6. 
 68. Id. § 1, at 8. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. § 1, at 9. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Hollerich v. City of Good Thunder, 340 N.W.2d 665, 668 (Minn. 1983) 
(quoting Kvanli v. Vill. of Watson, 272 Minn. 481, 484, 139 N.W.2d 275, 277 
(1965)). 
 75. Peterson, supra note 64, § 1, at 10. 
 76. Daniel J. Koevary, Automobile Leasing and the Vicarious Liability of Lessors, 32 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 655, 663 (2005). 
 77. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 934 (8th ed. 2004). 
 78. Hern v. Nichols, 91 Eng. Rep. 256 (1709); Lane v. Cotton, 88 Eng. Rep. 
853 (1701); Tuberville v. Stampe, 91 Eng. Rep. 1072 (1697); Boson v. Sandford, 87 
Eng. Rep. 212 (1689); Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and Fundamental Issue of 
Employer Vicarious Liability, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1739, 1746 (1996) [hereinafter 
Schwartz, Employer Vicarious Liability].  As late as the 1680s, English courts ruled 
that an employer was liable only if he had “commanded” the specific negligent act 
of his employee, rejecting employer vicarious liability.  Gary T. Schwartz, The 
Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 641, 695 (1989) [hereinafter 
Schwartz, Early American Tort Law]. 
9
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Exchequer in 1721,79 but was accepted in a 1738 decision80 and 
restated by Blackstone in his 1765 Commentaries.81
American courts accepted employer vicarious liability in the 
early 1800s.82  At first, the application of the doctrine was imperfect 
and uncertain.83  Today, however, vicarious liability is consistently 
applied to hold an employer liable for its employee’s negligent act 
toward a third party, as a result of a special relationship between 
the employer and employee.84
Vicarious liability must be justified differently than negligence 
liability because it imposes liability on a party not at fault, typically 
an employer.85  There are at least three identified policy goals of 
the vicarious liability doctrine: (1) enterprise liability/allocation of 
resources; (2) risk/loss spreading; and (3) 
prevention/deterrence.86
 79. Naish v. E. India Co., 92 Eng. Rep. 1160, 1163 (1721) (“[n]othing is . . . 
more certain” than that a master is not per se liable for his servant’s in-service 
wrongs). 
 80. Jarvis v. Hayes, 93 Eng. Rep. 1047 (1738). 
 81. Schwartz, Early American Tort Law, supra note 78, at 695.  See also 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 430–31 (1765). 
 82. Schwartz, Employer Vicarious Liability, supra note 78, at 1746. 
 83. For example, since Justice Holt and Blackstone each characterized the 
rule as a resolution of the equities between the employer and a “stranger,” 
American courts gave the vicarious liability doctrine a narrow interpretation with 
respect to the issue of an employer’s liability to an injured employee.  Schwartz, Early 
American Tort Law, supra note 78, at 696–97; Schwartz, Employer Vicarious Liability, 
supra note 78, at 1747–48. 
 84. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS 660 
(11th ed. 2005). 
 85. Koevary, supra note 76, at 663. 
 86. ARTHUR BEST & DAVID W. BARNES, BASIC TORT LAW 390 (2003); Steven N. 
Bulloch, Fraud Liability Under Agency Principles: A New Approach, 27 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 301, 303 (1986).  Thomas Baty analyzed nine different justifications that had 
historically been put forth for vicarious liability: (1) Control—Based on the 
premise that to an extent, a master controls the actions of his servant; (2) Master’s 
Benefit from Servant’s Work—The master should bear the burdens caused by 
servants because the master obtains the benefit of the servant’s work; (3) 
Revenge—Put forward by Holmes because he thought vicarious liability for 
servants originated with liability for actions of slaves; (4) Care and choice—If the 
master chooses his servants poorly, he ought to suffer, rather than the innocent 
victim; (5) Identification—Qui facit per alium facit per se, the servant’s act is the 
master’s act; (6) Evidence—It is often difficult to identify the individual 
responsible for a tortious act; where all possible responsible parties are servants of 
the same master, vicarious liability ensures the plaintiff will succeed; (7) 
Indulgence—Bacon originally put forth this idea that people are allowed to 
employ others only by an indulgence of the law, and part of the price they must 
pay is liability for their servant’s acts; (8) Danger—Pollock believed that a person 
who employed a servant was setting a dangerous operation into motion, which is 
10
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1. Enterprise Liability/Allocation of Resources 
Enterprise liability theory focuses on allocation of resources.  It 
is “the means by which society seeks to ensure that the employer 
bears the costs of its operation.”87  In Judge Friendly’s view, 
vicarious liability finds its basis “in a deeply rooted sentiment that a 
business enterprise cannot justly disclaim responsibility for 
accidents which may fairly be said to be characteristic of its 
activities.”88  Under this theory, an employer is liable for torts of its 
employee because the employee is acting for the employer’s 
benefit, and the enterprise is liable for the costs associated with 
doing business.89  The price of a good or activity should reflect any 
accident costs it might cause, and if an enterprise is held liable for 
harms it causes, the “internalization of costs” is facilitated.90  An 
underlying aspect of this theory is also the principle that no party 
should be left without recourse to compensation for its injuries.91
The enterprise liability theory is based on the allocation of 
resources justification.92  A fundamental assumption is that on the 
whole, people know what is best for them.93  It is important for 
people to know the costs of producing goods in order to determine 
analogous to keeping a water reservoir or wild animals on one’s land; (9) 
Satisfaction—An employer is usually wealthier than a servant and is capable of 
paying damages while a servant usually is not.  PATRICK S. ATIYAH, VICARIOUS 
LIABILITY IN THE LAW OF TORTS 15–22 (1967). 
 87. JEFFREY M. KAPLAN ET AL., COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND THE CORPORATE 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 24:2 (2006).  See Bulloch, supra note 86, at 316 (stating 
that the “price of the employer’s product should reflect the cost of compensating 
the [potential tort] victim”); Koevary, supra note 76, at 663 (stating that enterprise 
liability, the “predominant theory” justifying vicarious liability, “holds that an 
enterprise should be liable for the costs associated with its business”). 
 88. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d. Cir. 
1968). 
 89. Koevary, supra note 76, at 663–64. 
 90. DAN B. DOBBS & PAUL T. HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 625 (5th ed. 
2005). 
 91. Koevary, supra note 76, at 664–65.  Under enterprise liability, the chances 
a plaintiff can recover are increased because he can sue more or wealthier 
defendants, and victims of insolvent employees are left with a remedy.  Id.  As a 
result, the enterprise is allowed to “impose large costs on society through actions 
of their employees.”  Id. at 665.  According to the enterprise liability theory, the 
Urbans should not have to face the risk that Post 184 is insolvent, and American 
Legion Department of Minnesota and the American Legion National should be 
responsible for the cost of doing business. 
 92. Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 
YALE L.J. 499, 501–02 (1961). 
 93. Id. at 502. 
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what they really want.94  Prices should reflect actual costs of 
competing goods, which enables buyers to make informed 
decisions in purchases.95  Under a strict resource allocation theory, 
it is important for the prices of goods to accurately reflect their full 
cost to society.96  Hence, the theory requires that the cost of injuries 
be borne by the activities that caused them, regardless of whether 
fault is involved.97  The theory also requires that “among the several 
parties engaged in an enterprise the loss should be placed on the 
party which is most likely to cause the burden to be reflected in the 
price of whatever the enterprise sells.”98
2. Risk/Loss Spreading 
The second theory of justification for vicarious liability 
attempts to shift risk to those better positioned to spread losses.99  
Proponents of the loss-spreading theory suggest that enterprises are 
more capable of spreading losses.100  One reason for their theory is 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 505. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. KAPLAN, supra note 87; Bulloch, supra note 86, at 316.  In 1923, Young B. 
Smith introduced the loss-spreading theory in an article for the Columbia Law 
Review entitled Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444 (1923) (noting that the 
master should be held responsible for his servant’s actions because “it is socially 
more expedient to spread or distribute among a large group of the community the 
losses which experience has taught are inevitable in the carrying on of industry, 
than to cast the loss upon a few”).  The principle of loss distribution first came to 
be recognized in the field of industrial accidents.  ATIYAH, supra note 86, at 23.  
The cost of industrial accidents was originally not placed on the employer, but 
instead a great part of the cost was imposed on the victim.  Id.  In 1881, Sir Edwin 
Chadwick opposed views that industrial accidents should not be paid for by 
employers, based on the reasoning that they were not the employer’s fault, and 
that they were inevitable risks of employment.  Id. at 23–24.  Instead, Chadwick 
said, “[T]he costs of the accidents, and of the resultant widowhood and orphanage 
are a necessary consequence of your business and should be borne by the trade, 
and ultimately by the consumer, and not by the parish rates on which they are so 
heavy a burden.”  Id. at 24.  Eventually, this view was used as a justification for the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1897.  Id.  It was soon discovered that the same 
principles were present in cases of vicarious liability.  Id. 
 100. Bulloch, supra note 86, at 306.  Underlying this theory is the assumption 
that the injured party would have to bear the entire loss if the enterprise is not 
made to absorb it.  Id.  In Urban, the Department and National are presumably in a 
better position to absorb the costs of the injuries because insurance is arguably 
more easily obtainable by them.  See generally Urban v. Am. Legion Dep’t of Minn., 
723 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2006). 
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that most employers are not individuals, but corporations.101  The 
cost of liabilities can be spread by an enterprise over a period of 
time, and “distributed [across] a larger section of the 
community.”102  Enterprises can use “the mechanisms of insurance, 
profit reduction, wage reduction, and price increases” to distribute 
costs.103  In this way, losses can be efficiently spread among 
employees, customers, producers of similar products, and others.104  
For example, an enterprise generally insures itself against legal 
liabilities.105  Insurance costs can be covered by goods and services 
sold, which in turn will be passed on to the consumer in the form 
of higher prices.106
Even if an enterprise does not have insurance, or if it is 
uneconomical to pass extra costs on through higher prices, 
enterprises are still capable of spreading losses.107  Increased costs 
may be distributed among the shareholders, staff, and employees of 
the enterprise.108  This is accomplished through smaller dividend 
payments to shareholders and smaller wage increases for 
employees.109  To allocate part of the cost to one class rather than 
the other would be practically impossible.110  Typically, both 
methods of distribution will occur, and it will be impossible to 
isolate the cost incurred from insurance against tort liabilities 
because so many factors are present in management decisions 
regarding dividends, prices, and wages.111
3. Deterrence/Prevention 
Finally, deterrence/prevention is a theory often used to justify 
vicarious liability.112  This theory operates under the assumption 
that masters have the ability to control servants and are in the best 
 101. ATIYAH, supra note 86, at 23. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Bulloch, supra note 86, at 306. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See ATIYAH, supra note 86, at 23. 
 106. Id.  Furthermore, the consumer may also be able to spread the cost if the 
consumer is a business entity, rather than an individual.  Id. 
 107. Id.  Some larger enterprises will find it more appropriate to self-insure.  
Id.  It may not be possible for an enterprise to pass on costs through higher prices 
because of fierce competition in the industry.  Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. KAPLAN, supra note 87. 
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position to prevent torts.113  In theory, “if the tortfeasor is a servant 
and the tort is committed within the scope of [his] employment, no 
one, other than the tortfeasor himself, is in a better position than 
the master to prevent the [tortious action].”114  Furthermore, 
imposing liability “creates a strong incentive for vigilance by those 
in a position ‘to guard substantially against the evil to be 
prevented.’”115  Strict liability for an employee’s tort will 
theoretically encourage employers to take necessary precautions to 
prevent torts from occurring.116  For example, an employee making 
a delivery using his employer’s vehicle runs a red light and injures a 
pedestrian.117  Both the employee and the employer will be liable to 
the pedestrian for the pedestrian’s injuries.118  Under the 
prevention theory, the employer could, and presumably should, 
have taken precautions to prevent the accident, such as requiring 
traffic safety training for its drivers.119
 113. Bulloch, supra note 86, at 315.  Some might argue that, for this control 
reason, the Department and National should not be vicariously liable.  See Urban v. 
Am. Legion Dep’t of Minn., 723 N.W.2d 1, 5–6 (Minn. 2006) (concluding that 
because the legislature has chosen not to include an element of vicarious liability 
in the CDA since its enactment, the exclusion is significant).  In the dissent, 
however, Justice Hanson makes a valid point that while the quantity of control by 
the Department and National is not likely sufficient to create a principal-agent 
relationship, the two do have the right to control the “specific aspect of [Post 
184’s] business that is alleged to have caused the [plaintiffs’] harm.”  Id. at 13 
(Hanson, J., dissenting) (quoting Kerl v. Dennis Rasmussen, Inc., 682 N.W.2d 328, 
341 (2004)).  Justice Hanson went on to explain that the aspect of Post 184’s 
business that caused the harm is the illegal sale of alcohol to a non-Legion 
member, which is specifically prohibited by the Department and National.  Id.  
The enforcement of the rule is essential to the Department and National because 
if it is not enforced they might lose a group tax exemption granted by the Internal 
Revenue Service.  Id.  Under the rules of the exemption, only members of 
National may be served in bars of the local posts.  Id.  Under this reasoning, 
vicarious liability is applicable.  Id. 
 114. Bulloch, supra note 86, at 303–04. 
 115. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 14 (1991) (quoting Louis 
Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 116 (1927)). 
 116. Bulloch, supra note 86, at 304.  The rule may seem overbroad when 
viewed this way.  DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND LLCS § 3.2.3 
(Aspen 3d ed. forthcoming 2008).  If the goal is to encourage employers to engage 
in conduct that enables employees to act safely, why impose liability when the 
employer has used reasonable care to select, train, and supervise its employees 
properly?  Id.  There are two possible answers to this question.  Id.  First, both 
enterprise liability and risk spreading take a broad approach to imposing liability.  
Id.  Second, a narrow rule would lead to problems proving negligence on the part 
of the employer, making the rule ineffective.  Id. 
 117. Bulloch, supra note 86, at 304. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
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D. Respondeat Superior 
The primary application of vicarious liability is “an employer’s 
obligation to pay for an employee’s tortious conduct,” known as 
respondeat superior.120  In 1894, Professor John Wigmore 
determined that the evolution of respondeat superior occurred in 
three phases from the 1500s to the 1800s.121  Originally, respondeat 
superior was based on a theory in which the master himself 
breached his duty to the plaintiff by ordering his servant to commit 
a tort.122  After Lord Holt was appointed Chief Justice of the King’s 
Bench in 1689, the Implied Command theory developed.123  The 
Implied Command theory imposed liability on an innocent master 
because “seeing somebody must be a loser . . . it is more reason that 
he that employs and puts a trust and confidence in the wrongdoer 
should be a loser, than a stranger.”124
Under the modern common-law doctrine of respondeat 
superior, an employer125 may be held vicariously liable for a tort 
 120. BEST & BARNES, supra note 86, at 387. 
 121. Rhett B. Franklin, Pouring New Wine Into an Old Bottle: A Recommendation 
For Determining Liability of an Employer Under Respondeat Superior, 39 S.D. L. REV. 570, 
573–74 (1994). 
 122. Id. at 574. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at n.32 (quoting S.C. Ins. Co. v. James C. Greene & Co., 348 S.E.2d 
617, 622 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986)). 
 125. The terminology relating to respondeat superior is in transition.  
KLEINBERGER, supra note 116, § 3.2.2.  Under the Restatement (Second) of Agency, 
“[a] servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and 
who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is 
subject to the other's control or right to control.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 220 (1958).  Under the Restatement (Third) of Agency, “an employee is 
an agent whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner and 
means of the agent's performance of work . . . .”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY 
§ 7.07(3)(a) (2006).  The Restatement (Third) of Agency modified the 
terminology because “the connotation that household service is the prototype for 
employment is dated, as is its suggestion that an employer has an all-pervasive 
right of control over most dimensions of the employee's life.”  Id. at intro. cmt. B.  
“The difference is a matter of semantics, not substance.”  KLEINBERGER, supra note 
116, § 3.2.2. 
  Unfortunately, the current Restatement terminology is not a perfect 
solution because “employer” and “employee” have well-established everyday 
meanings.  Id.  “The resulting connotation is that the agency law meaning 
corresponds to the ordinary meaning, and that connotation is inaccurate.  While 
all employees in the lay sense may well be employees in the [Restatement (Third)] 
sense, not all [Restatement (Third)] employees are necessarily employees in the 
lay sense.”  Id. 
15
Mann: Torts: Respondeat Superior and the CDA: Letting the Superior Off
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
9. MANN - ADC 6/11/2008  6:03:34 PM 
1504 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:4 
 
committed by his employee126 if the tort was committed within the 
scope of employment.127  If applicable, respondeat superior 
automatically holds the employer liable for the employee’s tortious 
actions, regardless of whether the employer authorized, forbade, or 
used all reasonable means to prevent the misconduct.128
III. THE URBAN DECISION 
In Urban, Todd Urban and his family were involved in a 
collision with a drunk driver.  The collision resulted in injuries to 
himself and his children, as well as the loss of his wife.  Urban, on 
behalf of himself and his minor children, brought an action against 
American Legion Post 184 (the place where Rolland, the drunk 
driver, became intoxicated) under the CDA.129  The Urbans also 
sued the American Legion Department of Minnesota 
(Department) and the American Legion National (National) 
under alternative theories including respondeat superior.130  The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
 126. The Restatement (Third) of Agency outlines factors relevant in 
determining whether an agent is an employee:  
[T]he extent of control that the agent and the principal have agreed the 
principal may exercise over details of the work; whether the agent is 
engaged in a distinct occupation or business; whether the type of work 
done by the agent is customarily done under a principal's direction or 
without supervision; the skill required in the agent's occupation; whether 
the agent or the principal supplies the tools and other instrumentalities 
required for the work and the place in which to perform it; the length of 
time during which the agent is engaged by a principal; whether the agent 
is paid by the job or by the time worked; whether the agent's work is part 
of the principal's regular business; whether the principal and the agent 
believe that they are creating an employment relationship; and whether 
the principal is or is not in business.  Also relevant is the extent of control 
that the principal has exercised in practice over the details of the agent's 
work.   
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f (2006). 
 127. Franklin, supra note 121, at 572.  In order for the doctrine to apply, there 
must be a master-servant relationship between the employer and the employee 
who commits the tort and the tort must be committed within the employee’s 
“scope of employment.”  Id. at 572–73.  “Scope of employment” is defined as 
“[t]he range of reasonable and foreseeable activities that an employee engages in 
while carrying out the employer’s business.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1374 (8th 
ed. 2004). 
 128. KLEINBERGER, supra note 116, §3.2.1. 
 129. Urban v. Am. Legion Post 184, 695 N.W.2d 153, 156 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2005). 
 130. Urban v. Am. Legion Dep’t of Minn., 723 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Minn. 2006). 
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Department and National on all theories.131  The court of appeals 
affirmed the summary judgment rulings.132  Urban appealed to the 
Minnesota Supreme Court.133
A. Majority Opinion 
The Minnesota Supreme Court addressed whether the 
Department and National could be held vicariously liable on the 
theory of respondeat superior for Post 184’s liquor sale to 
Rolland.134  The court first looked to the language of the CDA and 
agreed with the Department and National that, because the 
language of the statute narrows the previous scope of the law from 
“employers” to “licensees,” the legislature specifically limited 
vicarious liability under the CDA.135
The CDA created a cause of action that did not exist at 
common law.136  The court relied on the presumption that statutes 
creating new causes of action do not abolish the common law 
unless they do so “by express wording or necessary implication.”137  
The court also presumed that every statute has a purpose, so no 
statutory language should be deemed unnecessary or 
insignificant.138  Furthermore, the court stated that Minnesota 
Statutes section 340A.501, which makes licensees responsible for 
the sale of alcohol by their employees, implies that the legislature 
did not expect respondeat superior to apply to CDA liability.139  The 
court opined that if respondeat superior applied to actions under 
the CDA, section 340A.501 would have no purpose.140
The court further argued that the doctrine of expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius—the expression of one thing indicates the exclusion 
of another141—suggests that the legislature meant that only licensees 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 3. 
 135. Id. at 5 (comparing MINN. STAT. § 340.941 (1984) with MINN. STAT. § 
340A.501 (2004)). 
 136. Id. (citing Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 34, 70 N.W.2d 886, 891 (1955)). 
 137. Id. (citing Shaw Acquisition Co. v. Bank of Elk River, 639 N.W.2d 837, 877 
(Minn. 2002)). 
 138. Id. (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs., Inc. v. Comm’r, 698 N.W.2d 408, 
423 (Minn. 2004); Vlahos v. R & I Constr. of Bloomington, Inc., 676 N.W.2d 672, 
679 (Minn. 2004)). 
 139. Id. at 5. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id.  See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004).  For example, the 
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are vicariously liable for the alcohol distribution.142  The court 
noted that the legislature had ample opportunity to recognize 
vicarious liability as it has in other statutes, since the CDA was 
enacted nearly 100 years ago.143  The court therefore “declines to 
act where the legislature has chosen not to.”144
Finally, the court stated that the legislature’s elimination of 
social-host liability leads it to conclude that the policy underlying 
the CDA is to “apply liability for alcohol-related harms to commercial 
vendors who profit from the sale of alcohol.”145  Even if the CDA 
applied to owners of licensees where owners receive profits from 
alcohol sales, the court argued that the Department and National 
would not be liable because neither receives revenue or profits 
from alcohol sales.146
B. Dissent 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Hanson concluded that the 
CDA does not abrogate, but instead incorporates, common-law 
principles of vicarious liability.147  He reasoned that the underlying 
cause of action alleged against Post 184 was for direct liability 
rule that “each citizen is entitled to vote” implies that noncitizens are not entitled 
to vote.  Id. 
 142. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 5. 
 143. Id. at 5–6.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 169.09, subdiv. 5(a) (Supp. 2005).  In 
1972, the court concluded that the CDA permitted social-host liability because 
liability could be incurred by “giving” alcohol to tortfeasors.  Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 
6 (citing Koehnen v. Dufour, 590 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Minn. 1999)).  Shortly 
thereafter, the legislature amended the CDA to remove “giving” and the court 
held that the amendment makes clear that the legislature was specifically denying 
social host liability.  Id. (citing Cole v. City of Spring Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836, 
840 (Minn. 1982)). 
 144. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 6.  The court went on to say that the CDA may be 
“liberally construed” where its “provisions are clear as to intent and purpose,” but 
must be “strictly construed in the sense that it cannot be enlarged beyond its 
definite scope.”  Id. (quoting Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 34, 70 N.W.2d 886, 891 
(1955)).  See generally 45 AM. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors § 460 (2007) (discussing 
interpretation of dram shop statutes). 
 145. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 6 (citing Cady v. Coleman, 315 N.W.2d 593, 595–96 
(Minn. 1982)). 
 146. Id.  The Urbans argued that the court should extend respondeat superior 
because the decision in Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 438, 57 N.W.2d 
254, 262 (1943) states that masters may be held liable for the actions of their 
servants under the CDA.  Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 6–7.  The court dispelled this 
argument by stating that while Hahn used a master-servant argument, it was 
decided before the legislature adopted section 340A.501, which amended the 
CDA.  Id. at 7. 
 147. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 7 (Hanson, J., dissenting). 
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under the CDA, but the claim against the Department and National 
was for vicarious liability under common-law principles of 
respondeat superior.148  In support of this conclusion, Justice 
Hanson indicated that Hahn pointed out that common-law 
vicarious liability applies to the CDA, and a principal may be held 
liable under common-law respondeat superior where its agent is 
directly liable under the CDA statute.149  The true legal issue, 
according to the dissent, is whether, under Hahn, the Department 
and National were vicariously liable under common law as 
principals of Post 184 for the direct statutory liability of Post 184.150
The dissent also argued that the CDA has been construed 
liberally in determining proper plaintiffs to bring CDA claims, and 
the same liberal rule of construction should be used in deciding 
proper defendants to a CDA claim.151  Justice Hanson argued that 
the maxim “the expression of one thing indicates the exclusion of 
another” is not applicable where the two things are consistent.152  
He also agreed with Professor Dickerson’s opinion that expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius is one of a few Latin maxims that 
“masquerade as rules of interpretation while doing nothing more 
than describing results reached by other means.”153  Justice Hanson 
dismissed the majority’s arguments relating to profits from alcohol 
sales and the analogy to social hosts by stating that these facts are 
only relevant to direct liability under the CDA, not vicarious 
liability.154  Finally, the dissent suggested that the failure of the 
legislature to address vicarious liability in the CDA statute does not 
indicate intent to eliminate it.155
 148. Id. at 8.  Justice Hanson opined that the majority commingled the 
separate theories of liability (direct liability under CDA and vicarious liability 
under respondeat superior) and applied the elements of one to the analysis of the 
other.  Id. 
 149. Id.  Hanson read the language of section 340A.501 as adding to a 
licensee’s common law vicarious liability as an employer by creating a direct 
statutory liability, rather than limiting vicarious liability only to licensees.  Id. 
 150. Id.  The court’s case law on the rule of statutory construction for newly 
created causes of action creates a presumption that statutes are consistent with the 
common law and should be construed strictly against the notion that they 
abrogate the common law.  Id. (citing Shaw Acquisition Co. v. Bank of Elk River, 
639 N.W.2d 837, 877 (Minn. 2002)). 
 151. Id. at 9–10. 
 152. Id. at 10. 
 153. Id.  See also DICKERSON, supra note 27, at 234–35. 
 154. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 11 (Hanson, J., dissenting). 
 155. Id.  Justice Hanson gave two reasons to support his conclusion.  First, in 
over forty years since Hahn, the legislature took no action to eliminate common 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE URBAN DECISION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court is forced to deal with 
competing interests in its examination of Urban.  On one hand, the 
CDA must be “strictly construed in the sense that it cannot be 
enlarged beyond its definite scope.”156  On the other hand, a statute 
creating a new cause of action, such as the CDA, must not abrogate 
common law unless it does so “by express wording or necessary 
implication.”157
The majority’s approach to resolving the competing interests is 
unsound for a number of reasons.  First, the court mistakenly 
commingled direct statutory liability under the CDA with vicarious 
liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.158  Next, the 
court employed a flawed theory of statutory construction.159  Finally, 
the court erroneously concluded that legislative inaction affirms 
judicial correctness.160
A. CDA/Vicarious Liability Split 
In Hahn, the Minnesota Supreme Court holds that common-
law vicarious liability is applicable under the CDA to make a master 
liable for the torts of its servants acting within the scope of 
employment.161  Through section 340A.501 of Minnesota Statutes, 
the legislature specifically extended liability to licensees for sales of 
alcohol made by their employees.162  In the view of Justice Hanson, 
section 340A.501 supplements the common-law vicarious liability of 
a licensee by creating direct statutory liability for licensees, who 
may or may not already be liable as employers under the common 
law.163  The majority focused its analysis on whether the 
law vicarious liability under the CDA.  Id.  Second, until the court of appeals’ 
decision in this case, the legislature did not have a reason to consider that a court 
might interpret section 340A.501 as abrogating vicarious liability.  Id. 
 156. Id. at 6 (majority opinion) (quoting Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 34, 70 
N.W.2d 886, 891 (1955)). 
 157. Id. at 5 (quoting Shaw Acquisition Co. v. Bank of Elk River, 639 N.W.2d 
837, 877 (Minn. 2002)). 
 158. See infra Part IV.A. 
 159. See infra Part IV.B. 
 160. See infra Part IV.C. 
 161. Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 438, 57 N.W.2d 254, 262 
(1953). 
 162. MINN. STAT. § 340A.501 (2004). 
 163. Urban v. Am. Legion Dep’t of Minn., 723 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 2006) 
(Hanson, J., dissenting). 
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Department and National had direct statutory liability under 
section 340A.501.164  Instead, the majority should have focused on 
whether the Department and National had common-law vicarious 
liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior, as principals for 
Post 184, which was directly liable under the CDA.  This mistake 
renders the majority’s reasoning flawed from the start. 
B. Statutory Construction 
The court relied on the principle expressio unius est exlusio 
alterius in reaching its decision that only licensees are liable under 
the CDA.165  Latin canons of statutory construction, particularly 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, have been highly criticized for 
many years.166  In particular, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
reliance on expressio unius in the Urban case is unsatisfactory 
because, in the words of Professor Dickerson, it is used to 
“describ[e] results reached by other means.”167
The majority argued that section 340A.501 limits liability 
under the CDA to licensees, thereby abrogating the common law.168  
In his dissent, however, Justice Hanson correctly argued that 
section 340A.501 enlarges common-law respondeat superior liability 
of a licensee by eliminating two possible defenses available under 
the common law: (1) the licensee is not the employer of the person 
making the illegal sale; and (2) the person making the illegal sale is 
not acting within the scope of his or her employment.169
The court’s “well-settled case law” on statutory construction for 
statutes that create new causes of action presumes that statutes do 
not abrogate the common law unless they do so by “express 
wording or necessary implication.”170  Justice Hanson further 
clarified that although the court has said it construes such statutes 
“strictly,” it has meant that it construes them “strictly against the 
notion that they abrogate the common law.”171  Justice Hanson 
continued, “we construe such statutes liberally in favor of the 
continued existence of the common law.”172  But, the majority turns 
 164. See id. at 4–5 (majority opinion). 
 165. Id. at 5. 
 166. See, e.g., DICKERSON, supra note 27, at 234. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 6. 
 169. Id. at 11 (Hanson, J., dissenting). 
 170. Id. at 9. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
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that rule on its head by presuming that the failure to mention 
common-law vicarious liability principles means the legislature 
intended to abrogate them. 
There are a number of reasons why expressio unius “is not 
useful as a standard of construction” in this case.173  First, the 
maxim is not meant to be used and applied universally.174  It is not a 
rule of law, but merely an aid to construction.175  More specifically, 
the rule is applicable only in the interpretation of statutes in which 
the intention of the lawmakers is not otherwise clear.176  It should 
never be used to override the clear purpose of the legislature.177
The Minnesota Supreme Court held in Hollerich v. City of Good 
Thunder that it is appropriate to consider the purpose of the Dram 
Shop Act as an aid to interpreting statutory language and 
determining legislative intent.178  According to the prevailing view, 
“civil damage acts . . . are to be liberally construed so as to suppress 
the mischief and advance the remedy.”179  The CDA “provides an 
extremely effective incentive for liquor vendors to do everything in 
their power to avoid making illegal sales,” by imposing the sanction 
of strict liability.180  Simultaneously, the CDA “compensate[s] 
members of the public who are injured as a result of illegal liquor 
sales . . . .”181
If the CDA’s purpose is to be a means to interpret the intent of 
the legislature, then restricting liability to only Post 184 is not in 
accordance with that intent.  Legislative intent as to the application 
of the CDA is not ambiguous, and therefore, the use of expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius is not appropriate.182
Another reason expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not a fitting 
maxim of statutory construction is that it assumes legislative 
omniscience.183  According to critics, the maxim “would make sense 
 173. Id. at 10. 
 174. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 130 (2007). 
 175. Id. 
 176. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 130 (2007); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 323 (2007). 
 177. 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 130 (2007); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 323 (2007). 
 178. Hollerich v. City of Good Thunder, 340 N.W.2d 665, 667 (Minn. 1983). 
 179. Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 436, 57 N.W.2d 254, 261 
(1953). 
 180. Skaja v. Andrews Hotel Co., 281 Minn. 417, 423, 161 N.W.2d 657, 661 
(1968). 
 181. Id. at 422, 161 N.W.2d at 661. 
 182. See Skaja, 281 Minn. at 422, 161 N.W.2d at 661; Hahn, 238 Minn. at 436, 57 
N.W.2d at 261. 
 183. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the 
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only if all omissions in legislative drafting were deliberate.”184  
Expressio unius “assumes that the legislature thinks through 
statutory language carefully, considering every possible variation.”185  
Unfortunately, this is often untrue because the legislature does not 
think about certain possibilities or it assumes courts will fill in any 
gaps.186  In 1973, Judge Skelly Wright deemed the maxim 
increasingly unreliable because “it stands on the faulty premise that 
all possible alternative or supplemental provisions were necessarily 
considered and rejected by the legislative draftsmen.”187
When the legislature added section 340A.501 to the CDA, it is 
extremely likely that it did not think about the possibility that the 
court would interpret its express mention of licensees as an 
exclusion of other classes of principals liable under the common 
law.  It is irrational to assume that the failure of the legislature to 
mention common-law principles of vicarious liability indicates that 
the principles were “considered and rejected by the legislative 
draftsmen.”188  Legislative omniscience is not a valid assumption, 
which adds further force to the argument that expressio unius is 
highly unreliable in statutory construction. 
A third limitation of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius is that context must determine its applicability.  Professor 
Reed Dickerson argues that it is one of several Latin maxims that 
“masquerade as rules of interpretation while doing nothing more 
than describing results reached by other means.”189  He adds: 
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 813 (1983). 
 184. Id. 
 185. ESKRIDGE, supra note 25, at 824. 
 186. See id. 
 187. Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 482 F.2d 672, 676 
(D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 188. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 25, at 824.  This is true especially in light of the 
long-standing presumption that statutes creating new causes of action do not 
abrogate the common law.  Since the legislature knew that an employer was 
already held responsible for the torts of its employee, the express mention of 
common-law vicarious liability was probably deemed unnecessary. 
 189. DICKERSON, supra note 27, at 234.  Perhaps, then, the majority had 
alternative grounds upon which it based its decision not to allow the vicarious-
liability claims against the Department and National.  Vicarious liability is one of 
the most firmly established common-law principles, but many lawyers have felt that 
there is something so exceptional about vicarious liability that it needs 
justification.  ATIYAH, supra note 86, at 12.  One author opined, “[t]hat there could 
hardly be greater injustice than to take away A’s property and give it to B because 
C has injured B seems clear, yet that is the result of the maxim respondeat superior.”  
Id. (quoting Frederic Cunningham, Respondeat Superior in Admiralty, 19 HARV. L. 
REV. 445, 445 (1906)).  At first glance, vicarious liability appears to contradict two 
23
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Far from being a rule, it is not even lexicographically 
accurate, because it is simply not true, generally, that the 
mere express conferral of a right or privilege in one kind 
of situation implies the denial of the equivalent right or 
privilege in other kinds.  Sometimes it does and 
sometimes it does not, and whether it does or does not 
depends on the particular circumstances of context.  
Without contextual support, therefore, there is not even a 
mild presumption here.  Accordingly, this maxim is at best 
a description, after the fact, of what the court has 
discovered from context.190
In determining whether context allows application of the 
maxim, one must determine whether the “contrast between a 
specific subject matter which is expressed and one not mentioned 
leads to an inference that the latter was not intended to be 
included . . . .”191  If there is a special reason for mentioning one 
thing and not the other, which is otherwise within the statute, the 
absence of mention of the other thing will not exclude it.192  The 
maxim also does not apply to a statute in which some things are 
mentioned only by way of example.193
The contextual argument against the application of expressio 
unius is present in Justice Hanson’s dissenting opinion.194  He 
correctly argued that the maxim may describe a logical conclusion 
where the included item is inconsistent with the excluded item, but 
that where the two items are consistent, it makes no logical sense.195  
In Urban, the two things are direct statutory liability of a licensee 
under the CDA and vicarious liability of the licensee’s principal 
under respondeat superior.196  The two are complementary because, in 
principles of torts.  Id.  First, it seems a person should only be liable for damages 
caused by his acts or omissions.  Id.  Second, a person should only be liable when 
he is at fault.  Id.  Nonetheless, the policy reasons underlying the doctrine of 
vicarious liability provide a stronger argument for allowing the suits to be brought. 
 190. DICKERSON, supra note 27, at 234–35 (footnotes omitted).  For example, 
Mother tells Sally, “Don’t hit, kick, or bite your sister Anne.”  ESKRIDGE, supra note 
25, at 824–25.  Sally is not authorized by expressio unius to “pinch” her little sister, 
because the baseline “no harming sister” should not be narrowly limited.  Id.  On 
the other hand, if Mother tells Sally, “You may have a cookie and a scoop of ice 
cream,” Sally may not have the candy bar sitting on the table.  Id. 
 191. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 323 (1999). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Urban v. Am. Legion Dep’t of Minn., 723 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2006) 
(Hanson, J., dissenting). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
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its own way, each serves the purpose of strengthening the 
regulation of the sale of alcohol and furthers the purpose of the 
CDA.197  There is no contextual support for the application of 
expressio unius here, and therefore, it should not be applied. 
A final flaw in the application of expressio unius, and of maxims 
of statutory construction in general, is that every canon has an 
equal and opposite counter canon.  Nearly sixty years ago, Karl 
Llewellyn offered the theory that, “[a]s in argument over points of 
case-law, the accepted convention still, unhappily requires 
discussion as if only one single correct meaning could exist.  Hence 
there are two opposing canons on almost every point.”198  In 
opposition to “[e]xpression of one thing excludes another,” 
Llewellyn countered: “[t]he language may fairly comprehend many 
different cases where some only are expressly mentioned by way of 
example.”199
In the Urban case, one might argue that principals should be 
included because the CDA could comprehend cases beyond those 
specifically mentioned in the statute’s language, particularly if it is 
evident that the statute has a purpose that would be advanced by 
including principals.200  As evidenced in Hollerich, the CDA’s 
purpose would be advanced by construing the statute to include 
liability by principals.201
One might also argue in opposition to expressio unius, as Justice 
Hanson did in his dissenting opinion, that statutes creating new 
causes of action should be strictly construed against the notion that 
they abrogate the common law.202  Another possible counter to the 
expressio unius canon is that remedial statutes should be construed 
liberally to “suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.”203  The 
CDA has a remedial objective and therefore should be construed 
liberally to compensate members of the public who are injured by 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 405. 
 200. See W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 
1167, 1185–88 (2005) (discussing Llewellyn’s theories by using an example of a 
railroad company governed by a federal statute). 
 201. See Hollerich v. City of Good Thunder, 340 N.W.2d 665, 667–68 (Minn. 
1983). 
 202. Urban v. Am. Legion Dep’t of Minn., 723 N.W.2d 9, 10 (Minn. 2006) 
(Hanson, J., dissenting). 
 203. Hahn v. City of Ortonville, 238 Minn. 428, 436, 57 N.W.2d 254, 261 
(1953). 
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illegal liquor sales.204  In light of the counter canons that can be 
offered in opposition to expressio unius, it is clearly not sufficient to 
explain the reasoning of the court. 
C. Legislative Inaction 
In Urban, the majority argued that if the legislature had 
intended for vicarious liability to apply under the CDA it would 
have amended the CDA to include this liability, and the majority 
“declines to act where the legislature has chosen not to.”205  Not 
only is the majority’s logic faulty, but the practice of inferring 
legislative intent through legislative inaction is ill-advised. 
The majority claimed that in the “nearly 100 years since 
enacting the CDA,” the legislature has had “ample opportunity . . . 
to recognize vicarious liability.”206  In contrast, the Hahn court, in 
1953, found that vicarious liability applied under the CDA to hold 
the employer of the person making the illegal sale liable.207  As 
Justice Hanson pointed out in his dissenting opinion, the 
legislature has taken no action in over forty years since Hahn to 
eliminate the common-law claim of vicarious liability under the 
CDA.208  Instead, in 1985, the legislation extended direct statutory 
liability to licensees who otherwise would have had to satisfy the 
elements of common-law vicarious liability.209
The portion of the CDA that the majority claims abrogates 
common-law vicarious liability was not enacted until 1985.  
Therefore, the majority is incorrect in stating that the legislature 
has had “ample opportunity in the nearly 100 years since enacting 
the CDA to recognize vicarious liability.”210  Furthermore, until the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals decided Urban in 2005, the legislature 
had no reason to think that Minnesota courts might interpret 
section 340A.501 as limiting the CDA to licensees.211  Therefore, it 
is incorrect for the majority to assume that the legislature’s failure 
to act affirms the court’s interpretation of the statute. 
 204. See Hollerich, 340 N.W.2d at 668. 
 205. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 5–6. 
 206. Id. at 5. 
 207. Hahn, 238 Minn. at 438, 57 N.W.2d at 262. 
 208. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 11 (Hanson, J., dissenting). 
 209. MINN. STAT. § 340A.501 (2004). 
 210. Urban, 723 N.W.2d at 5 (majority opinion). 
 211. See id. at 11 (Hanson, J., dissenting). 
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Regardless of whether the legislature had time to amend the 
CDA, the majority’s suggestion that legislative inaction equates to 
judicial accuracy is misguided.  “In the realities of the legislative 
process, almost no reliable inference of current intent could be 
drawn” from legislative silence.212  The legislature may be unaware 
of relevant court decisions applying the particular statute.213  The 
legislature may also be too busy with other public matters to take 
action in response to a court’s decision.214  Alternatively, the 
legislature may not “consider the matter important enough to 
engage the attention of the whole legislative process.”215
Justice Scalia has adamantly disagreed with the view that 
legislative inaction can effectively be interpreted in any consistent 
way: 
The “complicated check on legislation,” The Federalist 
No. 62, p. 378 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961),216 erected by our 
Constitution creates an inertia that makes it impossible to 
assert with any degree of assurance that congressional 
failure to act represents (1) approval of the status quo, as 
opposed to (2) inability to agree upon how to alter the 
status quo, (3) unawareness of the status quo, (4) 
indifference to the status quo, or even (5) political 
cowardice . . . .  I think we should admit that vindication 
by congressional inaction is a canard.217
 212. DICKERSON, supra note 27, at 181. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id.  Professor Dickerson gave an example of the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Mann Act in Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1916).  
“Certainly the . . . interpretation . . . was considered a perversion of congressional 
intent, and yet political considerations intervened to head off corrective 
legislation.”  Id. 
 216. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 378 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
 217. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Scalia opined that if “congressional inaction proves judicial 
correctness,” it is difficult to explain the results of the application of the liability of 
municipal corporations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Id.  Scalia goes on to mention 
that in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), the Court held that section 1983 
did not reach municipalities.  Id.  After Congress did not overturn the decision, 
the Court was once again faced with the question in Monell v. New York City 
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978), and it overturned the Monroe 
decision.  Id.  The Johnson majority believed that the Monell decision was wrongly 
based on Congress’ seventeen years of silence, which the Johnson Court felt 
established that Monroe’s interpretation was correct.  Id.  At the time of the Johnson 
opinion, nine years had passed since the Monell opinion, and Congress still had 
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The premise that if the legislature had intended for vicarious 
liability to apply to the CDA it would have amended the statute to 
expressly include it is unfounded.218
V. CONCLUSION 
In Urban, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that the 
doctrine of respondeat superior is based not on the fault of the 
employer, but on the policy determination that liability should be 
allocated to the employer as a cost of engaging in business.219  The 
doctrine’s objective of “let[ting] the superior make answer”220 
complies with the remedial purpose of the CDA.  The two theories 
of liability serve the same purpose of strengthening the regulation 
of alcohol sales.  Unfortunately, the majority commingled these 
separate theories of liability.  Then it compounded its error by 
applying an inappropriate canon of statutory construction.  Finally, 
by viewing legislative inaction as proof of its own accuracy, the 
majority based its decision on a faulty view of legislative intent.  In 
doing so, the Minnesota Supreme Court defeats the purpose of 
respondeat superior.  Rather than letting the superior make 
answer, it let the superior off the hook. 
 
not amended section 1983.  Id.  Justice Scalia asked, should we now “assume that 
[Monell’s] interpretation was correct?”  Id. 
 218. Furthermore, vicarious liability is a common-law theory entirely separate 
from the CDA, so if the CDA is presumed not to abrogate the common law, 
vicarious liability already applies and need not be mentioned expressly in the 
statute. 
 219. Urban v. Am. Legion Dep’t of Minn., 723 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2006) 
(quoting Fahrendorff v. N. Homes, Inc., 597 N.W.2d 905, 910 (Minn. 1999)). 
 220. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1338 (8th ed. 2004). 
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